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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO by and through LAWRENCE
G. WASDEN, Attorney General,

)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

vs.

)
)
)

SCOTT MAYBEE d/b/a SMARTSMOKER.COM,
BUYCHEAPCIGARETTES.COM and
ORDERSMOKESDIRECT.COM

)
)
)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
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NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY

Respondent State of Idaho, by and through its Attorney General, Lawrence G. Wasden,
submits the following supplemental authority pursuant to Rule 34(f), I.AR.
On January 20, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in Philip

Morris USA, Inc., v. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc., et al., 2009 WL 115589 (9 th Cir.
2009). The Court's reasoning at *9 of the Westlaw cite is relevant to the arguments in Section
IV.I. (p. 36) and Section IV.J. (p. 38) of Respondent's brief.
In addition to Westlaw, the decision can be found on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals'
website at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2009/01/20/06-36066.pdf. A Westlaw
copy of the decision is attached.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26 th day of January, 2009.
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ATTORNEY GENERAL
STA TE OF IDAHO
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BRETT T. DeLANG
Deputy Attorney General
Consumer Protection Division

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 26 th day of January, 2009, I caused to be served two true and
correct copies of the foregoing instrument by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

J. Walter Sinclair
W. Christopher Pooser
Stoel Rives LLP
101 S. Capitol Blvd., Suite 1900
Boise, ID 83 702
Margaret A. Murphy
54 Hollywood Ave.
Buffalo, NY 14220
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Deputy Attorney Genera
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Westlaw"
--- F .3d ------ F.3d ----, 2009 WL 115589 (C.A.9 (Wash.)), 09 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 677
(Cite as: 2009 WL 115589 (C.A.9 (Wash.)))
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
PHILIP MORRIS USA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

KING MOUNTAIN TOBACCO COMPANY,
INC.; Mountain Tobacco; Delbert L. Wheeler, Sr.;
Richard Kip Ramsey, Defendants-Appellees.
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the Yakama Indian Reservation, along with Delbert
L. Wheeler, Sr. and Richard "Kip" Ramsey, company founders and members of the tribe
(collectively, "King Mountain"), sell King Mountain cigarettes in packaging that Philip Morris
claims infringes and dilutes its trademarks and
trade dress.

No. 06-36066.

Argued and Submitted May 10, 2007.
Filed Jan. 20, 2009.
Daniel P. Collins, Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP,
Los Angeles, CA, for the plaintiff-appellant.
J. Michael Keyes, Theresa L. Keyes, and Bart J.
Freedman, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates
Ellis LLP, Spokane, WA, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Washington; Robert H. Whaley,
District
Judge,
Presiding.
D.C.
No.
CV06-03073-RHW.
Before MEL VIN BRUNETTI, M. MARGARET
McKEOWN, and WILLIAM A. FLETCHER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION
McKEOWN, Circuit Judge:
*1 This case is yet another of the difficult Indian
jurisdiction cases considered by this court. The precise question presented is whether there is colorable
tribal court jurisdiction over a nonmember's federal
trademark and related state law claims against tribal
defendants for alleged passing off of cigarettes on
the Internet, on the reservation of another tribe, and
elsewhere. Philip Morris USA, Inc. manufactures
and markets Marlboro cigarettes, one of the most
recognized brands in the United States. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc., a tribal corporation on

We are faced with dueling lawsuits. Philip Morris
sued King Mountain in federal court, alleging various federal and state law claims and seeking,
among other things, injunctive relief against King
Mountain's continued sale of its products. King
Mountain followed with an action for declaratory
relief against Philip Morris in Yakama Tribal
Court, which prompted Philip Morris to seek an injunction in federal court against the tribal proceedings. King Mountain asked the district court to stay
its proceedings pending the Tribal Court's determination of its jurisdiction.
The district court granted King Mountain's requested stay, concluding there was a colorable claim to
tribal court jurisdiction under the formulations
found in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544
(1981), Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997), and Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001).
We agree that these cases provide the foundation
for our analysis, but we disagree that they point to a
colorable claim of jurisdiction. Rather, we conclude
that the Tribal Court does not have colorable jurisdiction over nonmember Philip Morris's federal and
state claims for trademark infringement on the Internet and beyond the reservation.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Philip Morris, the maker of Marlboro-brand cigarettes, claims that Marlboro is the most well-known
and best-selling brand of cigarettes. Philip Morris
sells Marlboro cigarettes throughout the United
States and the world, including to stores on the
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Yakama Reservation. Philip Morris contracts directly with some of these stores, while others obtain
its products through distributors.
Delbert Wheeler and Richard "Kip" Ramsey are
both enrolled members of the Yakama Indian Nation. Together they own Mountain Tobacco Company, d/b/a King Mountain Tobacco Company,
Inc., which is a corporation that was formed and licensed under the laws of the Yakama Indian Nation
in 2004. King Mountain began selling cigarettes to
stores on the Yakama Reservation in early 2006,
and shortly thereafter to members of other Indian
tribes, including the Onodaga Nation and Seneca
Tribe in New York, via phone and mail orders.
King Mountain cigarettes are also sold to the general public via the Internet, through websites such as
www .cheap-cig.com and www. l 23smoke.com, but
King Mountain denies that it markets its cigarettes
on the Internet or sells directly to those that do.
There is no contractual or other relationship
between King Mountain and Philip Morris.
*2 Philip Morris's Marlboro packaging bears a distinctive "red roof' design, featuring two red triangles filling the top comers of its otherwise white
package such that there is a white peak with red
above it. King Mountain's cigarette packages feature an image of a snowcovered mountain against a
red backdrop. Several aspects of Philip Morris's
package design are registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office ("the
US PTO"). Registration Nos. 938,51 O; 1,544,782;
and 1,038,989.

<- Image delivery not included with current Options setting. ->

Philip Morris claims that the appearance of King
Mountain's packaging is a close copy or imitation
of its Marlboro packaging such that consumers are
both actually and likely to be confused, that Philip
Morris's Marlboro trademark is infringed and diluted, and alleges that its reputation is tarnished.
King Mountain, on the other hand, argues that its

packaging depicts Mt. Adams-known as "Pahto" in
the Yakama Nation-a mountain of spiritual and cultural significance to the Yakama Tribe and that any
resemblance to Philip Morris's packaging is inadvertent and incidental. King Mountain applied to
register its package design but the USPTO refused
registration, citing two of Philip Morris's registrations.
Philip Morris filed suit against King Mountain in
federal district court, alleging violations of the Lanham Act and Washington state law. The amended
complaint includes claims for trademark infringement, trade dress infringement, trademark dilution,
and unfair competition.
King Mountain responded by filing an action for
declaratory relief in the Yakama Tribal Court,
claiming that Philip Morris "[had] come upon the
reservation to do business without permission of the
Yakama Indian Nation, [was] not licensed thereby,
and in so doing ... submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the Yakama Tribal Court."King Mountain
sought a declaration that it was not infringing Philip
Morris's trademark and trade dress and further alleged that Philip Morris's actions violated the
Yakama Treaty of 1855. Once it received notice of
this tribal court action, Philip Morris sought an injunction in federal court against those proceedings.
In response to Philip Morris's effort to enjoin King
Mountain's continued use of its packaging, King
Mountain argued that Philip Morris had failed to
exhaust tribal remedies, and that it had not shown a
likelihood of success on the merits of the Lanham
Act claims. The district court denied Philip Morris's
requested injunctions and granted King Mountain's
motion to stay the federal case to allow the Tribal
Court to address its own jurisdiction. The district
court reasoned, relying on Stock West Corp. v.
Taylor, 964 F.2d 912, 9 I9(9th Cir.1992) (en bane ),
that "abstention is appropriate where there exists a
'colorable question' whether the tribal court has
jurisdiction over the asserted claims."The court
framed the question as whether "the Yakama Indian
Nation could regulate the activities at issue in this
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case" and concluded that "[i]t is not clear that the
tribe would not have regulatory authority over
trademarks .... " The court also concluded that it is
not clear "whether tribal courts have adjudicative
authority to address trademark claims against tribal
members whose conduct occurred on reservation
lands."ln light of these uncertainties, the district
court held there was a colorable question of the existence of tribal court jurisdiction over the case.

*3 On appeal from this order, Philip Morris argues
that the court improperly denied its motions for injunctions and erred in granting King Mountain's
motion to stay the district court proceedings. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U .S.C. § I292(a)( 1) to
review the order denying these injunctions and
granting the motion to stay the proceedings. Agcaoili v. Gustafson, 870 F.2d 462, 463 (9th
Cir.1989) (holding that jurisdiction over appeal
from grant of motion to stay is proper under 28
U.S.C. § 1292(a)(l)).

Page 3

ing guiding principles. In considering tribal jurisdiction, we look first to the member or nonmember
status of the unconsenting party, which is, in this
case, Philip Morris, a nonmember. Hicks, 533 U.S.
at 382 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is the membership status of the unconsenting party, not the status
of real property, that counts as the primary jurisdictional fact.")."As to nonmembers ... a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative
jurisdiction."Strate, 520 U.S. at 453.
Apart from treaties, there are two potential sources
of tribal jurisdiction: a tribe's inherent sovereignty
and congressional statutory grant. In general, "the
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not
extend to the activities of nonmembers of the
tribe."Montana. 450 U.S. at 565. This restriction is
"subject to two exceptions: The first exception
relates to non-members who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the second
concerns activity that directly affects the tribe's
political integrity, economic security, health, or
welfare."Strate, 520 U.S. at 446.

ANALYSIS
Tribal jurisdiction cases are not easily encapsulated, nor do they lend themselves to simplified
analysis. The Supreme Court itself observed that
questions of jurisdiction over Indians and Indian
country are a "complex patchwork of federal, state,
and tribal law."Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 680 n.
I (1990). And we have acknowledged that "(t]here
is no simple test for determining whether tribal
court jurisdiction exists."Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873
F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1989). Despite these complications, the answer to the tribal jurisdiction question in this case can be divined in a logical fashion
from the teachings of three Supreme Court cases:
Montana, Strate, and Hicks. These teachings are affirmed in important respects by the Court's most recent tribal jurisdiction decision in Plains Commerce
Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 128 S.Ct.
2709 (2008).
These cases provide the foundation for the follow-

If neither of the Montana exceptions is applicable,
we consider "whether such regulatory jurisdiction
has been congressionally conferred."Hicks, 533
U.S. at 360. Tribal courts are not, however, courts
of general jurisdiction, and a mere failure to affirmatively preclude tribal jurisdiction in a statute does
not amount to a congressional expansion of tribal
jurisdiction. Id. at 367("[The] historical and constitutional assumption of concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law cases is completely missing with respect to tribal courts .... Tribal courts, it
should be clear, cannot be courts of general jurisdiction in this sense .... "). Finally, tribal jurisdiction
is, of course, cabined by geography: The jurisdiction of tribal courts does not extend beyond tribal
boundaries. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532
U.S. 645,658 n. 12 (2001).
*4 Taking these principles together, we conclude
that the Yakama Tribal Court does not have colorable jurisdiction over King Mountain's tribal action
for declaratory relief insofar as it implicates Philip
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Morris's federal trademark infringement claims
against King Mountain and its principals, members
of the Yakama Tribe. Thus, exhaustion would
"serve no purpose other than delay."Strate, 520
U.S. at 460 n. 14.FN 1To understand the basis for
this conclusion beyond the summary principles
cited above, it is useful to begin with an explication
of the Supreme Court's decision in Montana and
trace its application through Strate and Hicks.
FNl. We review de novo the question
whether exhaustion of tribal court remedies is required. Boozer v. Wilder, 381 F.3d
93 I, 934 (9th Cir.2004).

I. THE MONT ANA RULE AND ITS PROGENY
In Montana, in considering a tribe's authority to impose hunting and fishing restrictions on nonmembers within the reservation, the Supreme Court examined the scope of tribes' legislative power stemming from their inherent sovereignty, and found it
narrowly limited with respect to nonmembers. The
"exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary
to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent
status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without
express congressional delegation." Montana, 450
U.S. at 564. From this observation, the Court deduced "the general proposition that the inherent
sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."ld. at
565.
"To be sure," the Court noted, "Indian tribes retain
inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands."ld. First, "[a]
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements." Id. (citing Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), and other cases).
Second, "(a] tribe may also retain inherent power to

exercise civil authority over the conduct of nonIndians on fee lands within its reservation when
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on
the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe." Id. at 566 (again citing Williams, 358 U.S. 217, and other cases). Outside of these two exceptions, as the Court emphasized in Montana, the tribes' inherent sovereignty
does not give them jurisdiction to regulate the
activities of nonmembers. See Plains Commerce
Bank, 128 S.Ct. at 2720 ("Given Montana's general
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an
Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe, efforts by a tribe to regulate
nonmembers, especially on non-Indian fee land, are
presumptively invalid.") (internal quotations and
citations omitted).
While delineating the scope of tribes' regulatory
jurisdiction over nonmembers, Montana did not directly address the scope of tribes' adjudicatory jurisdiction. The Supreme Court turned to the question
of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction sixteen years later
in Strate. Strate arose out of a traffic accident
between two nonmembers that occurred on a state
highway running through the reservation. In support of tribal court jurisdiction, the plaintiff argued
that Montana did not apply, because it only addressed the regulatory jurisdiction of tribes, not
their adjudicatory jurisdiction. In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "[w]hile Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court
broadly addressed the concept of 'inherent sovereignty.' " Strate, 520 U.S. at 453 (quoting
Montana, 450 U.S. at 563). "As to nonmembers," it
held that "a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not
exceed its legislative jurisdiction. Absent congressional direction enlarging tribal-court jurisdiction,
we adhere to that understanding. Subject to controlling provisions in treaties and statutes, and the
two exceptions identified in Montana, the civil authority of Indian tribes and their courts with respect
to non-Indian fee lands generally 'do[es] not extend
to the activities of non-members of the tribe.' " Id.
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565) (alteration in
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original). While leaving open whether tribes' adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers is narrower
than the legislative jurisdiction delineated in
Montana, the Court made clear in Strate that it is, at
least, no broader.
*5 Finally, in Hicks, the Court confronted the issue
of tribal adjudicative jurisdiction over nonmembers
stemming not from the tribe's inherent sovereignty,
the focus of Montana, but from a congressional
grant. The plaintiff in Hicks was a tribal member
who sued nonmember state officials under a federal
statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After concluding the tribal court did not have jurisdiction arising from its
inherent sovereignty under the Montana framework, the Court addressed the argument that tribal
courts are courts of general jurisdiction and thus
fully capable of adjudicating § 1983 claims. The
Court firmly rejected this position, reasoning that
the "historical and constitutional assumption of
concurrent state-court jurisdiction over federal-law
cases is completely missing with respect to tribal
courts."Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367. It then turned to
whether the federal statute gave the tribe jurisdiction: "It is true that some statutes proclaim tribalcourt jurisdiction over certain questions of federal
law .... (But] no provision in federal law provides
for tribal-court jurisdiction over § 1983 actions." Id.
at 367-68.The Court went on to note that tribal jurisdiction over § 1983 suits wou Id be problematic,
because the federal removal statute did not provide
for removal from tribal court, which would deny
those sued in tribal court the right to a federal forum that they would otherwise enjoy. Id. at 368.
From these three foundational Supreme Court
cases, we can discern the ground rules governing
tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers.
As a general rule, tribes do not have jurisdiction,
either legislative or adjudicative, over nonmembers, and tribal courts are not courts of general
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, stemming from their inherent sovereignty, tribes do have legislative jurisdiction within the two Montana exceptions. The
Montana framework is applicable to tribal adjudic-

ative jurisdiction, which extends no further than the
Montana exceptions. Beyond the jurisdiction they
enjoy from their inherent sovereignty, tribes may
also be granted jurisdiction via treaty or congressional statute.

II. APPLICATION OF TRIBAL JURISDICTION PRINCIPLES

A. THE MONT ANA EXCEPTIONS
The evolution of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
leaves us with the firm conclusion that we should
begin our analysis under Montana. While it is unclear whether meeting the Montana exceptions is
sufficient for tribal court jurisdiction-that is, whether tribal adjudicative jurisdiction extends to the
boundary of tribal legislative jurisdiction-we have
no doubt that it is necessary.
King Mountain, however, argues that Montana is
not applicable to this case, either in its general rule
or its exceptions. Rather, King Mountain takes the
position that Montana only applies to suits involving the activities of nonmembers, i.e., suits
with nonmember defendants, whereas King Mountain's tribal action for declaratory relief effectively
involves a tribal member defending the lawfulness
of its activities against the claims of a nonmember,
de facto plaintiff. While it is true that the Supreme
Court has never applied Montana to a case involving a tribal defendant, Montana itself, as well
as subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit
precedents, supports our conclusion that the
Montana framework is the starting point for suits
involving nonmembers generally, whether as
plaintiffs or defendants.
*6 In Montana, the Court cited Williams, 358 U.S.
217, as exemplifying each of the two exceptions to
its general rule. Importantly, Williams involved a
suit by a nonmember against a member of the
Navajo tribe to collect for goods allegedly purchased on credit from the plaintiffs shop within the
Navajo Reservation. In other words, Williams in-
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volved a member defendant and the activities of
that member defendant. If, as King Mountain suggests, Montana does not apply to such cases at all,
it is inconceivable that the Court would have
chosen Williams to illustrate Montana's exceptions.
The soundness of this reasoning was confirmed in
Plans Commerce Bank, where the Court said: "We
cited four cases in explanation of Montana's first
exception [including Williams ]. Each involved regulation of non-Indian activities on the reservation
that had a discernable effect on the tribe or its
members." 128 S.Ct. 2721. And, as noted earlier, in
cases involving non-members, the inquiry focuses
primarily on whether a non-member is being haled
into tribal court against his will, not whether the
party is the plaintiff or defendant. See, e .g., Hicks,
533 U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring) ("It is the
membership status of the unconsenting party ... that
counts as the primary jurisdictional fact."). This approach does not, however, mean that party alignment is not an important factor in the appropriate
case. FN 2
FN2. Although Judge Fletcher insists that
we seek to undermine Williams and are unfaithful to Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir.2006)
(en bane ), his criticism is without justification. We faithfully follow Smith, which
applied Williams within the Montana
framework in concluding that tribal court
jurisdiction existed over a non-member's
suit concerning on-reservation conduct.
See id. at 1137-40.In Smith, the nonmember's status as a plaintiff was crucial: "We
hold that a nonmember who knowingly
enters tribal courts for the purpose of filing
suit against a tribal member has, by the act
of filing his claims, entered into a
'consensual relationship' with the tribe
within the meaning of Montana."ld. at
1140.By contrast, Philip Morris does not
consent to tribal court jurisdiction, regardless of its party alignment as defendant and
de facto plaintiff. Significantly, we do not

conclude
that
party
alignment
is
"unimportant," Fletcher Concurrence at
747; rather, because Philip Morris is unconsenting, its nonmember status is the
"primary jurisdictional fact," Hicks, 533
U.S. at 382 (Souter, J., concurring).
Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider the Montana exceptions vis-# 2A#
-vis a tribal defendant, that fact seems more indicative of the unusual procedural posture of this case
than the scope of Montana's rule. Questions of exhaustion and tribal jurisdiction typically, although
not always, arise where a tribal member first sues a
nonmember in tribal court, the nonmember seeks a
stay against the tribal proceedings in federal court,
and the federal court must then decide whether to
defer to the tribal court out of principles of comity.
This case does not follow this pattern. Rather, here
it was only after being sued in federal court by
Philip Morris, the nonmember plaintiff, that King
Mountain, the member defendant, filed suit in tribal
court and invoked tribal court jurisdiction.
Tellingly, the only case the Supreme Court has encountered with a similar procedural posture to this
one was Williams, the very case it cited as exemplifying Montana's exceptions.
Finally, it is significant that this court, s1ttmg en
bane, recently invoked the Montana analysis in just
such a case. Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434
F.3d 1127, J 131(9th Cir.2006) (en bane) (holding
exhaustion required in light of a colorable claim to
tribal jurisdiction based on the first Montana exception).Smith concerned a tort claim by a student
against Salish Kootenai College arising out of a
traffic accident on a federal highway within the
Flathead Reservation, a reservation controlled by
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes. Id. at
1129.Smith, the putative plaintiff, was a member of
the Umatilla Tribe and thus was considered a nonat
member for jurisdictional purposes. Id.
1132-33.The college was a tribal entity, and thus
was treated as a member for jurisdictional purposes.
Id. at 1135.Notwithstanding the presence of a mem-
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ber defendant and nonmember plaintiff, we applied
Montana. Id. at I 130.Thus, in this circuit, the
Montana analysis is controlling in tribal jurisdiction
cases, regardless of the alignment of the member
and nonmember parties. This is not to say that
whether the nonmember is a plaintiff or defendant
is irrelevant to the analysis, but only that the analysis must take place within the Montana framework, with party alignment in the tribal court action
as the most important factor to be weighed in determining the application of Montana's rule and exceptions to the case at hand. See Smith, 434 F.3d at
113 I("First, and most important, is the party status
of the nonmember; that is, whether the nonmember
party is a plaintiff or defendant.... The Court has repeatedly demonstrated its concern that tribal courts
not require[nonmember defendants] to defend
themselves against ordinary claims in an unfamiliar
court."(intemal quotation marks and original brackets omitted)).
*7 We tum, then, to the Montana exceptions themselves. Any initial impression that this case falls
within the first Montana exception fades quickly
upon closer inspection. Under that exception, "[a]
tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts,
leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S.
at 565. Philip Morris acknowledges that as part of
its business, it has consensual relationships with tribal members. Stores located on the reservation and
operated by tribal members sell Marlboro cigarettes. Although the stores purchase from distributors rather than from Philip Morris, they have marketing arrangements with Philip Morris. The first
question, however, is whether there is a contract or
consensual relationship between Philip Morris and
King Mountain, the tribal member. The answer is
undisputably no. Philip Morris has no consensual
commercial relationship with King Mountain;
rather, they are market competitors. Nor has Philip
Morris otherwise consented to tribal jurisdiction by
voluntarily litigating its infringement claims against

King Mountain in tribal court. Cf Smith, 434 F.3d
at l l 36(holding Montana's first exception was satisfied because the nonmember consented to tribal
jurisdiction by choosing to file his claims against a
tribal member in tribal court). Philip Morris filed its
claims in federal court and has been haled into tribal court only as an unconsenting, de facto plaintiff
in King Mountain's tribal action for declaratory relief.
So, taking the question one step further, we ask
whether there is a nexus between Philip Morris's
commercial relationship with various stores operated by tribal members and the events that give rise
to this suit for trademark infringement. See Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656(holding that Montana requires
not only contacts, but contacts related to the events
out of which the suit arises). We hold there is not.
The mere fact that a nonmember has some consensual commercial contacts with a tribe does not
mean that the tribe has jurisdiction over all suits involving that nonmember, or even over all such suits
that arise within the reservation; the suit must also
arise out of those consensual contacts. In Atkinson,
the Supreme Court clarified that "[a] nonmember's
consensual relationship in one area ... does not trigger tribal civil authority in another-it is not 'in for a
penny, in for a Pound."Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656
(citation omitted); see also Strate, 520 U.S. at
457(holding Montana's first exception inapplicable
despite consensual commercial relationship with
the tribe, because the claim was unrelated to that relationship)."Montana's consensual relationship exception requires that the tax or regulation imposed
by the Indian tribe have a nexus to the consensual
relationship itself."Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 656.
*8 In Atkinson, the Navajo Tribe sought to collect a
hotel tax from all guests at hotels within the reservation boundaries. Although the tax would be imposed directly on guests, hotel owners and operators were charged with collecting it. Atkinson, a
nonmember proprietor of a hotel located within the
boundaries of the reservation, brought suit to enjoin
the tax. The Supreme Court noted that Atkinson's
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acquisition of a license to transact business within
the reservation put him in a consensual commercial
relationship with the tribe. Nevertheless, this relationship was not enough to support tribal jurisdiction under the first Montana exception, because the
tribe did not seek to impose the tax on activities
arising out of that relationship. Id. at 656.Rather,
the tribe sought to tax the activities of the guests,
namely staying overnight in a hotel. Thus, the
Court held, "it is clear that petitioner's 'Indian
trader' status by itself cannot support the imposition of the hotel occupancy tax." Id.
The Court reached a similar conclusion in
Strate. There, the plaintiff was involved in a traffic
accident with a nonmember subcontractor of a tribal corporation who "was on the reservation to perform landscaping work for the Three Affiliated
Tribes at the time of the accident...."Atkinson, 532
U.S. at 656. The plaintiff sued in tribal court,
claiming jurisdiction under the first Montana exception, but the Court determined the tribal court
was without jurisdiction. It held that "[a]lthough
[the subcontractor] was engaged in subcontract
work on the Fort Berthold Reservation, and therefore had a consensual relationship with the Tribes,
[the plaintiff] was not a party to the subcontract,
and
the
Tribes
were
strangers
to
the
accident."Strate, 520 U.S. at 457(intemal quotations omitted).
Here we face a similar situation. King Mountain
claims tribal jurisdiction exists over this suit under
the first Montana exception, and it points to Philip
Morris's sales and contracts with stores within the
reservation for the requisite consensual commercial
relationship. The fatal flaw with this position is the
same as that in Atkinson and Strate: there is no nexus between these contacts and the activity giving
rise to this lawsuit. Atkinson teaches that under the
first Montana exception, a tribe has authority to tax
a nonmember where the tax has a nexus to the
"consensual
relationship."
In extending the
Montana framework to the question of a tribal
court's adjudicative jurisdiction, we hold that a tri-

bal court has jurisdiction over a nonmember only
where the claim has a nexus to the consensual relationship between the nonmember and the disputed
commercial contacts with the tribe.
This suit is not about the marketing contracts
between Philip Morris and a handful of stores on
the reservation. Indeed, King Mountain is not a
party to any of these contracts, nor does it allege
any sort of consensual relationship with Philip Morris. Rather, the suit is about nationwide sales, including on the Internet and on other reservations, of
King Mountain cigarettes. As in Strate, the tribal
stores are "strangers" to the trademark infringement
claim,

*9 King Mountain's argument that both Philip Morris's contacts with the tribe and the conduct complained of involve the sale of cigarettes is not unlike the tribe's argument in Atkinson. There, the tribe
took the view that it could force a hotel owner to
collect a tax, because he had a license to operate a
hotel and the tax involved hotel guests. While the
subject matter was loosely the same, the required
relationship between the two scenarios was missing. The acts out of which this Lanham Act suit
arises are completely independent of Philip Morris's
contacts with the tribe. Even if Philip Morris had
never entered into these relationships, its lawsuit
would be exactly the same. Unlike a breach of contract claim where the unconsenting party was also a
party to the contract, see Williams, 358 U.S. at
2 I 7-18, or a misrepresentation and malpractice
claim against a tribe's legal representative, see
Stock West, 964 F.2d at 914-16, the acts complained of do not arise out of the nonconsenting
party's contacts with the tribe. This case, therefore,
falls outside of Montana's first exception.
Finally, it bears noting that this case is distinguishable from other cases by virtue of the breadth of the
challenged activity. Virtually all of the cases that
have held tribal exhaustion is required have concerned a single incident occurring on or near tribal
land or a contract directly with a tribal member. See
e.g., Strate, 520 U.S. at 442 (car accident); Willi-
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ams, 358 U.S. at 217- I 8 ( unpaid bill). In contrast,
this is a suit by the holder of a federally-registered
trademark for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and passing off through worldwide Internet sales and off-reservation sales to tribes in New
York. The focus of the complaint is the passing off,
which occurs beyond the reservation boundaries
and, according to Atkinson, beyond tribal jurisdiction. See also Plains Commerce Bank, 128 S.Ct. at
2719-20( emphasizing that tribal sovereignty stems
from the tribes' rights to control their land, and does
not extend beyond reservation boundaries). Even
though King Mountain disclaims direct responsibility for the sales, the complaint is against the presence of its cigarettes in the nationwide market. That
King Mountain may also sell its cigarettes on the
reservation does not alter the nationwide geographic scope of Philip Morris's claims.
As for the second exception, the claims in this case
are not of the type the Court had in mind when it
carved out an exception for tribal jurisdiction over
"conduct[that] threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or
the health or welfare of the tribe,"Montana, 450
U.S. at 566. The Yakama Tribe is not itself a party
to this case. To some extent, it can be argued that
torts committed by or against Indians on Indian
land always "threaten[ ] or ha[ve] some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."/d. But this
generalized threat that torts by or against its members pose for any society, is not what the second
Montana exception is intended to capture. See
Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 657 n. 12 ("Montana's second
exception can be misperceived. The exception is
only triggered by nonmember conduct that threatens
the Indian tribe; it does not broadly permit the exercise of civil authority wherever it might be considered necessary to self-govemment."(intemal
quotations omitted)). Rather, the second exception
envisions situations where the conduct of the nonmember poses a direct threat to tribal sovereignty.
Id. Pursuit of federal and state trademark claims
hardly poses a threat of that nature.

*10 It appears that in analyzing tribal sovereignty
the district court imported a general notion of tribal
regulatory authority unhinged from the Montana
exceptions. The district court predicated its holding
on the possibility of general tribal authority to regulate trademarks. But the question of tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers is linked, under
Montana, to the two specific exceptions, not to a
broad notion ofregulatory authority.
Whether the tribe may adopt its own trademark system is not at issue here. But surely the district court
is not suggesting that the tribe would have regulatory authority over federal trademark registration.
Significantly, Philip Morris holds federal trademarks and trade dress registered under the Lanham
Act, trademarks whose validity King Mountain apparently challenges. Seel5 U.S.C. § l l 19(under
federal law, the courts and the Patent and Trademark Office have concurrent jurisdiction over cancellation proceedings: "the court may determine the
right to registration, order the cancellation of registrations ... and otherwise rectify the register with respect to the registrations of any party to the action"). The presence of this federal regulatory
scheme highlights a further complication and underscores why the inquiry must be tethered to

Montana.

B. HICKS AND THE LANHAM ACT
Although the Tribal Court has no jurisdiction over
this case arising from its inherent sovereignty, because it does not fall within either of the Montana
exceptions, Hicks leaves open a second basis for
tribal jurisdiction: a congressional statutory grant.

Hicks examined whether tribal courts have jurisdiction to entertain federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In rejecting the claim that tribal courts are
courts of general jurisdiction and thus are an appropriate venue for federal civil rights claims, the
Court deemed that contention "quite wrong" and reiterated that, unlike state courts of general jurisdiction, "a tribe's inherent adjudicative jurisdiction
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over nonmembers is at most only as broad as its legislative jurisdiction." Hicks, 533 U.S. at 367. The
Court resolved that Congress did not enlarge tribalcourt jurisdiction vis-# 2A# -vis § 1983.
Applying the same principles to the Lanham Act,
we conclude that the Lanham Act "is not such an
enlargement." Id. at 366 n. 7. Nothing in the Lanham Act suggests that it was intended by Congress
to expand tribal jurisdiction. In fact, the Act makes
no mention of tribes at all. Hicks noted with respect
to § 1983, "tribal-court jurisdiction would create
serious anomalies" including the inability to exercise removal options. Id. at 368.A further sovereignty anomaly would be created under the Lanham
Act because of the courts' ability to cancel a federally-granted trademark, see15 U.S.C. § 1119, an
historical and constitutional interplay between federal law and state-court jurisdiction that "is completely missing with respect to tribal courts."Hicks,
533 U.S. at 367. Philip Morris argues that tribes
never have jurisdiction over federal statutory
claims, unless Congress explicitly grants it to them.
King Mountain argues that Tribal Courts always
have jurisdiction over such claims, unless Congress
explicitly precludes it. Both of these positions misread Hicks; Congress may, via statute, expand or
contract tribal jurisdiction, but where Congress is
silent-as in the Lanham Act-tribal jurisdiction rests
on inherent sovereignty, and its scope is prescribed
by Montana. Hicks does not, as Philip Morris suggests, stand for a rule that tribes have no jurisdiction over federal statutory claims absent an explicit
statutory grant. Hicks therefore provides no additional basis for or against tribal jurisdiction in this
case.

CONCLUSION
*11 For the above reasons, we hold that the
Yakama Tribal Court has no colorable claim to jurisdiction over this dispute.FN 3 Given the circumstances, exhaustion of Philip Morris's claims would
serve no purpose beyond delay, and is therefore inappropriate. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 369.

FN3. Philip Morris's complaint does not allege claims based on King Mountain's
sales of its cigarettes on the Y akama Reservation, although there are passing references to such sales in later pleadings. To
the extent that Philip Morris challenges
King Mountain's sales activities to stores
on the reservation, tribal court exhaustion
would be appropriate as to those claims, as
there would be a colorable claim that
Philip Morris's voluntary decision to sell
its cigarettes within the Reservation supplies the requisite voluntary commercial
relationship to meet Afontana's first exception with respect to claims arising in that
market.
Cf
Smith,
434
F.3d
at
l 132("where the non-members are the
plaintiffs, and the claims arise out of commercial activities within the reservation,
the tribal courts may exercise civil jurisdiction"); see also Ford Motor Co. v. Todecheene, 488 F.3d 1215, 1217 (9th
Cir.2007) ("[a party] will be deemed to
have exhausted its tribal remedies once the
[tribe's highest court] either resolves the
jurisdictional issue or denies a petition of
discretionary interlocutory review pursuant
to [tribal law.]").

REVERSED AND REMANDED.
W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge, concurring in judgment:
I concur in the judgment.
King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc., and
Yakama Tribe members Delbert Wheeler and
Richard "Kip" Ramsey (collectively, "tribal member defendants" or "defendants") allegedly infringed federal and state trademark rights of Philip
Morris by selling cigarettes with packaging and
designs that resemble those of Philip Morris's flagship Marlboro brand. Philip Morris sued the defendants in federal district court for trademark infringement. The defendants responded by suing
Philip Morris in tribal court, seeking a declaratory
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judgment that their packaging, designs, and sales do
not infringe. The tribal member defendants are actual defendants in the district court coercive suit
and de facto defendants in the tribal court declaratory judgment suit. See Skelly Oil v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
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power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal
self-government or to control internal relations is
inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation.

The district court appears to have thought that sales
both on and off the Yakama Reservation are at issue in this case. The district court noted in its order
granting the stay that "Defendants began selling
King Mountain cigarettes to smoke shops on the
Yakama Reservation in January 2006" and later
began to make off-reservation sales. The district
court concluded that because Philip Morris's federal
court suit made "claims against tribal members
whose conduct occurred on reservation lands ...
there exists a colorable question of the existence of
tribal court jurisdiction in this case over Philip
Morris."

*12 450 U.S. at 564 (internal citation omitted). The
Court then noted two exceptions to the limitation
on tribal power and tribal court jurisdiction. First,
even on reservation land owned in fee simple by
non-Indians a "tribe may regulate ... the activities
of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealing,
contracts,
leases,
or
other
arrangements."/d.
at
565( citations
omitted).
Second, tribal jurisdiction extends to "conduct of
non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation
when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."/d. at 566
(citations omitted).

The panel majority makes clear, however, that sales
by defendants of King Mountain cigarettes on the
Yakama Reservation are not at issue. It writes,
"Philip Morris's complaint does not allege claims
based on King Mountain's sales of its cigarettes on
the Yakama Reservation, although there are passing
references to such sales in later pleadings."Maj. op.
at 741 n. 3. Because the only sales at issue took
place off the Yakama Reservation, the question in
this appeal is straightforward and quite narrow:
Does the Yakama Tribal Court have colorable jurisdiction to decide whether off-reservation sales by
tribal member defendants infringe the Marlboro
trademark? The panel majority answers, correctly,
that it does not.

Under Montana, the tribal court clearly lacks jurisdiction over this suit, which arose out of offreservation conduct by tribal members that allegedly violated non-tribal law and injured a nontribal member. The first Montana exception does
not apply because the allegedly infringing conduct
took place off the reservation, and because Philip
Morris is not in a consensual relationship with the
defendants. The second exception does not apply
because the conduct took place off the reservation,
and because Philip Morris's legal claims do not
threaten the "political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."

The panel majority could have written a simple
opinion relying on Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981 ). There the Supreme Court wrote that
Indian tribes retain their inherent power to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic
relations among members, and to prescribe rules
of inheritance for members. But exercise of tribal

Rather than deciding this case based simply on
Montana, the panel majority engages in extended
dicta in an attempt to undermine the longstanding
presumption of Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217
(1959). In Williams, a non-member store owner
brought suit against Navajo tribal members for
goods bought on credit at a store located on the
Navajo Reservation. The Court upheld tribal court
jurisdiction. Williams has long stood for the proposition that a tribal court has jurisdiction over a civil
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suit arising out of on-reservation conduct brought
by a non-member plaintiff against a member defendant. See, e.g., Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law 608 (2005) (discussing Williams and stating that "[s]tate courts lack jurisdiction to hear actions against Indians arising within Indian country").
In its dicta, the panel majority seeks to undercut the
Williams presumption concerning party alignmentthat a tribal court has jurisdiction over suits
between members and non-members arising out of
on-reservation conduct when the non-member is a
plaintiff and the member is a defendant, though not
when the member is a plaintiff and the nonmember
is a defendant. For example, the panel majority
writes, "While it is true that the Supreme Court has
never applied Montana to a case involving a tribal
defendant, Montana itself, as well as subsequent
Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedents, supports our conclusion that the Montana framework is
the starting point for suits involving nonmembers
generally, whether as plaintiffs or defendants."
Maj. op. at 732 (emphasis added). It writes further,
"[I)n cases involving nonmembers, the inquiry focuses on whether a nonmember is being haled into
tribal court against his will, not whether the party is
the plaintiff or defendant."/d at 732.And it writes,
"Although the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider the Montana exceptions vis-# 2A#
-vis a tribal defendant, that fact seems more indicative of the unusual procedural posture of this case
than the scope of Montana's rule."/d. at
733.Finally, it writes, "Tellingly, the only case the
Supreme Court has encountered with a similar procedural posture to this one was Williams, the very
case it cited as exemplifying Montana's exceptions."/d at 733.
*13 In minimizing the importance of party alignment, the panel majority ignores our recent en bane
analysis in Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 434
F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.2006} (en bane}. The threejudge panel in Smith had held that the tribal court
did not have jurisdiction over a civil suit arising out

of a rollover accident on the reservation in which
the plaintiff was a nonmember and the defendant
was a member. The panel had concluded that the
Montana framework applies "whenever there is a
non-member party ."Smith v. Salish Kootenai College, 378 F.3d 1048, I 052 (9th Cir.2004). The panel wrote that the "Supreme Court has not distinguished between non-member plaintiffs and nonmember defendants."/d at n. 5. Based on this analysis, the three-judge panel concluded that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction.
Our en bane panel reversed. The en bane majority
explicitly disagreed with the three-judge panel's
conclusion that the alignment of parties is irrelevant
to the jurisdictional analysis:
The Court's recent cases, and our own experience
with the Montana exceptions, demonstrate that
there are two facts courts look to when considering a tribal court's civil jurisdiction over a case in
which a non-member is a party. First, and most
important, is the party status of the nonmember;
that is, whether the nonmember party is a
plaintiff or a defendant.... The Court has repeatedly demonstrated its concern that tribal
courts not require "defendants who are not tribal
members" to "defend [themselves against ordinary claims] in an unfamiliar court."Second, the
Court has placed some store in whether or not the
events giving rise to the cause of action occurred
within the reservation. Within the reservation,"[t]o be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent
sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians ... even on nonIndian fee lands .... "
The interaction of these factors-the status of the
parties and the connection between the cause of
action and Indian lands-is complex. Nevertheless,
the cases provide some guidance for our discussion, and we can summarize them as follows.
First, where the nonmembers are the plaintiffs,
and the claims arise out of commercial activities
within the reservation, the tribal courts may exercise civil jurisdiction. Second, where the non-
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members are defendants, the Court has thus far
held that the tribes lack jurisdiction, irrespective
of whether the claims arose on Indian lands.
434 F.3d at l l 3 l-32(first emphasis added; later emphases in original; brackets in original; citations
omitted).
Judge Gould, who had written the panel opinion in
Smith, dissented from the en bane opinion. He wrote:
The plain language of Montana indicates that its
framework applies to legal actions involving
"non-members" without limitation.... Moreover,
in illustrating the application of the Montana
framework, the Court has used Williams to illustrate examples of the Montana framework, indicating that nonmember plaintiffs, as well as nonmember defendants, fall within that doctrine.
*14 Id. at 1141-42 (Gould, J., dissenting). The other two members of the three-judge panel in Smithwho had joined Judge Gould in concluding that
party alignment is unimportant in determining tribal
court jurisdiction-were Judges McKeown and Brunetti. Judges McKeown and Brunetti, who comprise
the panel majority in the case now before us, were
not members of the en bane panel in Smith.

Second, the panel maJonty relies on the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Plains Commerce Bank v.
Long Family Land and Cattle Co ., 128 S.Ct. 2709
(2008). Maj. op. at 732. But in that case the Court
held that a tribal court did not have jurisdiction
over a suit brought by member plaintiffs against a
nonmember defendant. Because a nonmember rather
than a member was the defendant, the Williams presumption in favor of tribal court jurisdiction was
not at issue. Moreover, the Court cited Williams
with approval, giving no hint that it intended to cut
back or otherwise limit the Williams presumption.
128 S.Ct. at 2721.
Much of the panel majority's discussion in this case
is dicta, and much of that dicta is contrary to Supreme Court case law and to our en bane opinion in
Smith. Therefore, while I concur in the judgment, I
respectfully decline to join the panel majority's
opinion.
C.A.9 (Wash.),2009.
Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. King Mountain Tobacco
Co., Inc.
--- F.3d ----, 2009 WL 115589 (C.A.9 (Wash.)), 09
Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 677
END OF DOCUMENT

As in the three-judge panel decision in Smith, the
panel majority in this case minimizes the importance of party alignment. The panel majority justifies its conclusion that party alignment is unimportant in two ways. First, it relies on two string citations of Williams in Montana.Maj. op. at 732-33.
But those citations in no way suggested that
Montana was intended to undermine the Williams
presumption in favor of jurisdiction when a tribal
member is a defendant. Moreover, Montana was
decided long before our en bane decision in Smith;
indeed, the meaning of Montana and Williams was
central to our analysis in that case. Thus, string
citations of Williams in Montana can hardly be
used to escape our emphasis in Smith on the importance of party alignment.
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